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NONBUSINESS GUARANTY LOSS:
ORDINARY OR CAPITAL DEDUCTION?
INTRODUCTION
Primary objectives of almost every taxpayer are that his gains be
taxed as capital gains and his losses deducted as ordinary losses.1 These
objectives retain their significance when the taxpayer is also a stock-
holder. There are three basic methods that the stockholder-taxpayer
can employ to inject funds into his corporation: 2 stock purchase,
direct loan, or guaranty of the corporation's debt. In each, his primary
profit motive is the potential gain in value of his present stock holdings,
a capital gain. If he suffers a loss, he can look for an ordinary loss
deduction if he is a guarantor; however, his loss will be a capital deduc-
tion if he lent money directly or purchased more stock, unless he is
in the trade or busines of making loans or selling stock.3 Thus, the
guaranty offers certain advantages to a stockholder.
However, at the present time, the treatment of a guarantor's loss as
an ordinary loss is not a certain proposition. Congress, by failing to
specify the treatment to be given losses arising from individual guaran-
ties of corporate debt, and the courts, by not consistently defining
guidelines, have left this area in a confused state. Presently, the best
1. Taxpayers of course desire to reap the benefits of the capital gain sections (INT.
Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1201-02) and avoid the limitations on capital losses (Id. at §
1211). Ordinary loss treatment is still clearly preferable for most taxpayers despite
the 1964 change in section 1212 allowing an indefinite capital loss carryover for indi-
viduals.
2. Few individuals, other than stockholders, guarantee loans except for purely per-
sonal or purely business reasons. These two categories are the extremes and will be
mentioned briefly in the text. If the guarantor is a corporation, there is little problem
concerning the treatment of a loss; it is usually a business deduction. If the debtor is
an individual, the guaranty is usually covered by a special provision [1d. at § 166(f)].
Thus, the discussion will center around the individual (stockholder) guaranty of a
corporate obligation.
3. Under the INT. REv. CODE of 1954, trade or business expenses (§ 162), losses (§ 165),
and bad debts (§ 166) are deductible. See the text, infra, for further discussion of this
subject.
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such a guarantor can anticipate is that he can get an ordinary loss deduc-
tion at the cost of litigation.4
Preferably, Congress should make special provision for all losses in
conjunction with guaranteed debts-whether it should give such losses
capital or ordinary loss treatment is a matter for Congress to decide. In
the meantime, the Supreme Court should affirm the technical rules which
seem to have found favor with most of the courts.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Prior to 1942, all bad debts were deductible in full and, apparently,
guaranty losses were so deductible as bad debts.5 Of course, the tax-
payer had no objection to this treatment. Since almost all losses were
likewise deductible in full, the Commissioner had little interest in the
matter.
For various reasons,6 Congress added section 23 (k) (4) [now section
166 (d) (1)]7 to the Internal Revenue Code in 1942. It limited the loss
on a nonbusiness bad debt to a short term capital loss deduction. This
change triggered a tremendous problem-whether a bad debt loss is a
business or nonbusiness loss.8 Naturally, a guarantor's "bad debt" loss
could be business or nonbusiness depending on the factsY
4. Rev. Rul. 60-48, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 112.
5. E.g., Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 85-86 (1956).
6. H.R. REI. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942) gave, as an example, the abuse
of the previous statutes by making "loans" to friends and relatives with no expectation
of recovery. Such "loans" resulted in bad debts which were deductible as ordinary
losses. Taxpayers have tried without much success to say that the intent of Congress
was to limit nonbusiness bad debts to this one instance. See, e.g., 5 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 28.70, at 321 (1963 rev., Supp. 1968); Lewis, Deductibility of
Losses Arising from Business Ventures, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAX INsr. 625, 626-29.
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(k) (4), 56 Stat. 821 (1942) [now INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 166(d) (1)].
8. A nonbusiness debt is defined as a debt not created or the loss from which was
not incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business. INr. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 166(d).
9. The answers to this problem remain somewhat vague; however, the Supreme
Court in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), has made it clear that it will
be difficult for a lender or guarantor to meet the business test. Basically, one cannot
meet the business bad debt test unless his potential gain will be ordinary income and
will be different from that of an investor. For example, an individual would have to
promote businesses for a fee or commission or for sale in the ordinary course of
business to qualify for the "promoter" business. Most cases decided in this area have
involved direct loans to corporations; however, if it can be established that a guaranty
loss is a bad debt, then those cases would apply equally to guaranty losses. See Rev.
Rul. 60-48, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 112. For detailed discussion concerning business and
nonbusiness treatment of losses on loans and guaranties, see, e.g., Cohen, Hazy Position
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Section 23 (e)(2) of the 1939 Code [now section 165 (c)(2)]10
allowed a full deduction for a "loss" incurred in a transaction entered
into for profit. Thus, a guarantor who could not establish a business
bad debt l suddenly acquired an interest in showing that his loss was
a loss, and not a bad debt. In this manner the real issue of whether a
guarantor's loss was a bad debt or a loss arose.
JuDiciAL HisToRY
Under the rationale of Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,'2
sections 165 and 166 are mutually exclusive; if a loss is proved to be a
bad debt, then it cannot be deducted as a loss. However, taxpayers
have been allowed to plead and argue in the alternative. 3 If the tax-
payer can prove that he has a loss and not a bad debt, then he must
show that he had a profit motive or he might lose the deduction al-
together.14
1942 to Putnam
Generally, the Tax Court took the view that the guarantor had a
bad debt, based on the ancient guaranty theory of subrogation.' 5 Upon
payment of his obligation, the guarantor was seen as stepping into the
of Shareholders' Loans Clarified by Supreme Court in Whipple, 19 J. TAxAaToN 16
(1963); Lewis, supra note 6; Shlens & Brighton, New Cases on Tax Matters of
Guarantors, 41 TAxms 124 (1963). We shall assume that the guarantor cannot meet the
trade or business standards. Accordingly, the discussion is confined to a consideration
of whether a nonbusiness guaranty loss is a loss or a bad debt for tax purposes.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(e) (2), 53 Stat. 13 [now INr. REv. CoDE of
1954, § 165 (c) (2) 1.
11. The 1954 Code provides full deductions for business losses [§ 165(c) (1)] and
business bad debts [§ 166(a) ], and it appears that the same tests apply to each. (See note
9, supra; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77; S. REP'. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 90.) Therefore, if a taxpayer can meet the business test, it makes no difference
whether his economic loss is classified as a loss or as a bad debt.
12. 292 U.S. 182 (1933).
13. See, e.g., Bratton v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1954).
14. Positive proof that the transaction was entered into for profit may disprove a
purely business purpose; so, alternative arguing must be carefully conducted in this
area. See also note 45, infra.
15. Peter Stamos, 22 T.C. 885 (1954); Max Greenhouse, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 54,250
(1954); George Aftergood, 21 T.C. 60 (1953); Leo L. Pollak, 20 T.C. 376 (1953), rev'd,
209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954); William B. Cudlip, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 53,355 (1953),
rev'd, 220 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955); Kate B. Sherman, 18 T.C. 746 (1952). See Anne K.
Ansley, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 53,323 (1953), rev'd, 217 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1954); Agnes
I. Fox, 14 T.C. 1160 (1950), rev'd 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951). But see Abraham
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shoes of the creditor and acquiring the debt running from the debtor.16
For example, in Peter Stamos'7 the debtor corporation was insolvent
but, because it was still in existence, the Tax Court found a debt running
to the guarantor when he honored his obligation. The court held that
the guarantor had a nonbusiness bad debt deductible only as a short term
capital loss.
The taxpayers countered with the argument that section 23 (now
section 166) required that a debt become worthless within the taxable
year. The Supreme Court in Eckert v. Burnet' had implied, at least,
that there could be no deduction for a debt which was worthless when
acquired, that the debt must become worthless in the taxpayer's hands.' 9
In the usual situation, the corporate debtor was either insolvent (as in
Stamos) or, possibly, dissolved when the guarantor was called upon to
honor his obligation. Thus, the guarantor contended that he acquired
nothing-that the "debt" was worthless when acquired. He argued
that he simply had a loss (incurred in a transaction entered into for
profit, of course) resulting from his guaranty obligation.20
Greenspon, 8 T.C. 431 (1947) (earlier, more liberal view). At very least, subrogation
"compensated" for the section 23(e) (2) [now section 165(c) (2)J loss, thereby dis-
allowing any deduction under that section and forcing the taxpayer to claim a bad debt.
See Note, Loss Deduction for Quasi-Investors, 63 YALE L.J. 862, 865-66 (1954).
16. Most courts view a debtor-creditor relationship developing in this manner.
See, e.g., Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956). Some courts suggest a debt on
the basis of an implied promise running from the debtor to the guarantor. See Howell
v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 654 (1934); Estate of
Barnet L. Rosset, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 154,346 (1954); Alice duPont Ortix, 42 B.T.A.
173 (1940), rev'd on other grounds sub non., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 124
F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1941), aff'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 164 (1942). Although state
statutes may provide differently, the common law and prevailing American view is
that a debt does arise when the guarantor honors his obligation and meets the statutory
requirements.
17. 22 T.C. 885 (1954).
18. 283 U.S. 140 (1931).
19. Id. at 141. Judge Learned Hand in Shiman v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1932) and the Putnam Court in Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956), have
discredited this interpretation for the most part.
20. Some authorities mentioned another reason for allowing an ordinary deduction-
section 23(f) [nt. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23 (f), 53 Stat. 13; now Irrr. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 165 (a) I which allowed a deduction for losses "not compensated for by insur-
ance or otherwise." Since the subrogation claim was worthless, the loss was not com-
pensated for and was thus fully deductible. This argument is completely without
foundation unless the Spring City Foundry doctrine is completely ignored. That case,
of course, requires an initial inquiry as to whether a debt exists; if it does, no deduction
can be taken under the "loss" section. Some guarantors contended that the Spring
City Foundry rule of "mutual exclusiveness" should not apply, but they met with little
[Vol. 10:705
NONBUSINESS GUARANTY LOSS
The circuit courts, for a while, accepted this argument. They recog-
nized that subrogation rights existed, but did not find a debtor-creditor
relationship. These courts stressed the fact that the purpose of honor-
ing a guaranty obligation was not to acquire a worthless debt, but to
satisfy a contractual duty. In Fox v. Commissioner,"' the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a worthless subrogation claim against the
insolvent and settled estate of the taxpayer's long deceased husband 22
was not a bad debt. The court reversed the Tax Court, saying that the
decision in the latter was "unrealistic" and "strained." The fifth circuit
came to much the same result in Edwards v. Allen,23 where a corpora-
tion, though still in existence, was hopelessly insolvent when the guar-
anty obligation was honored. The court said that the taxpayer received
nothing, that the subrogation claim was worthless at its inception. In
Pollak v. Commissioner,24 the third circuit went even further than Ed-
,wards.25 Here the corporation was not only still in existence, but the
taxpayer received a small part (3.59%) of his subrogation claim. The
court simply said that the balance of the "debt" was worthless when
acquired, that there was no possibility or expectation of repayment.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals came to substantially the same
conclusion in Cudlip v. Commissioner26 and even the Tax Court agreed
in some cases similar to Fox where the debtor no longer existed.2 7
In 1955 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Putnam v.
Commissioner2 contrary to the general trend in the circuit courts. The
corporation's affairs had been wound up and its assets liquidated in
July, 1947. In December, 1948, almost eighteen months later, the tax-
payer was required to honor his guaranty obligations on bank notes of
the corporation. The circuit court limited the taxpayer to a section
23 (k) (4) [now section 166 (d) (1)] bad debt-capital loss deduction.
success. See generally Propp, What to Do About Bad Debts, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON
FED. TAx. 109, 126-27 (1955).
21. 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951), rev'g 14 T.C. 1160 (1950).
22. Prior to enactment of section 166(f) of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954 (see text ac-
companying notes 42-44 infra), there was no reason to differentiate between corporate
and non-corporate debtors.
23. 216 F.2d 794 (5th Cit. 1954).
24. 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'g 20 T.C. 376 (1953).
25. See also Ansley v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 252 (3d Cit. 1954).
26. 220 F.2d 565 (6th Cit. 1955), rev'g P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 53,355 (1953).
27. E.g., Abraham Greenspon, 8 T.C. 431 (1947); Frank B. Ingersoll, 7 T.C. 34 (1946).
28. 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cit. 1955). The decision was highly criticized at that time.
See, e.g., Plowman, Guaranteed Loans (Still Best Method of Getting Business Bad
Debt, Despite Putnam), 4 J. TAXATION 150 (1956).
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The Supreme Court and Putnam
Because the Putnam decision appeared to conflict with the view of
the other circuit courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, in
an eight-to-one decision, affirmed the circuit court." The taxpayer
relied heavily on the Edwards case, claiming that a new obligation arose
and that it was outside the scope of section 23 (k) [now section 166
(d) ] because it was worthless when acquired. The Court said:
The familiar rule is that, instanter upon the payment by the
guarantor of the debt, the debtor's obligation to the creditor be-
comes an obligation to the guarantor, not a new debt, but, by
subrogation, the result of the shift of the original debt from the
creditor to the guarantor who steps into the creditor's shoes.80
Thus, this old debt, which had value in the hands of the creditor be-
cause of the guaranty, became worthless in the hands of the guarantor.3 '
It also said that even if the "new debt" premise were true, there would
be no deduction under section 23 (e) [now section 165 (c)] because of
the Spring City Foundry doctrine.3 2 The majority opinion stated
that Pollack, Edwards, and Cudlip turned upon erroneous premises. 33
The Court cited Spring City Foundry, and said:
[T] he statutory scheme is to be understood as meaning that a loss
attributable to the worthlessness of a debt shall be regarded as a
bad debt loss, deductible as such or not at all.3
4
The Court further distinguished Eckert v. Burnet,3 5 saying that the latter
did not hold that an obligation worthless when acquired could not be
a bad debt.36
In dictum, the majority suggested that even the Fox case was not on
29. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
30. Id. at 85. See also id. at 88.
31. Id. at 89. See id. at 94-95 (dissenting opinion). This is definitely a poor argument
where the debtor is insolvent at the time of payment of the guaranty obligation be-
cause the debt running from the debtor has become worthless in the creditor's hands.
The creditor's value is based on a separate debt-one owed to him by the guarantor.
See Shlens & Brighton, New Cases on Tax Matters of Guarantors, 41 TAXEs 124 (1963).
32. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1956).
33. Id. at 88.
34. Id.
35. 283 U.S. 140 (1931).
36. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1956). See note 19, supra.
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sound ground3 7 The Court said that there is no real or economic dif-
ference between a direct or an indirect loan." On this basis, no distinc-
tion should be made where the debtor no longer exists, and the Court
suggested that the result in such a case should be the same. 9
Some writers felt that Putnam settled the question of guarantor's
losses.40 However, the case seems to have resolved only one narrow
question-whether the loss resulting from the payment of the debt of
an insolvent but existent corporation will be limited to capital loss treat-
ment as a bad debt. The Court answered that question in the affirmative,
holding that the same result would follow any time the guarantor ob-
tained subrogation rights.
The Effect of Legislative Changes
The 1954 Code adopted, essentially without change, sections 23 (k)
(4) and 23(e)(2) of the 1939 Code [sections 166(d) (1) and 165(c)
(2), respectively, of the 1954 Code]. Therefore, decisions under the
old Code are substantially unaffected by the new one.4 1
A new section [166 (f)] was added to the 1954 Code. It provides
for an ordinary deduction in the case of an individual guaranty of a
noncorporate obligation if the proceeds are used in the trade or business
of the borrower. The Putnam Court cited this new section in support
of its decision;42 the dissent reasoned that it would better support an
opposite result.43 It does not appear to have had a decisive effect on the
Putnam decision or to have greatly influenced other decisions.44
37. The Tax Court has held that Fox is no longer sound. Robert M. Dinkel, P-H
Tax Cr. Mem. 60,079 (1960); Albert Gersten, 28 T.C. 756 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
38. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 92 (1956).
39. Id. at 93 and see text accompanying note 21, supra.
40. Cohen, supra note 9, at 16; Note, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71
HARv. L. Rxv. 84, 192-94 (1957). See also Ferguson v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 403, 407
(4th Cir. 1958).
41. Putnam and other cases for a while after 1954 were decided under the 1939
Code, but referred to the 1954 Code on occasion.
42. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 86 (1956). Support arises from the
fact that the section declares that a discharge of an obligation as guarantor, endorser or
indemnitor ... shall be treated as a debt becoming worthless .... " Of course, this
language applies only under the circumstances specified in the statute.
43. Id. at 102 (dissenting opinion). The primary reasons for this approach are that
Congress had no reason to discriminate against guaranties of corporate debt and because
the language referred to in note 42, supra, cannot be extended beyond the specific
situation covered by the statute. See also Plowman, supra note 28, at 150.
44. See, e.g., 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 6, at n. 57; Note, supra note 40. But see Plow-
man, supra note 28, at 150.
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Post Putnam
Since the Supreme Court clarified what results should follow when
guarantors acquire subrogation rights, the taxpayers have been trying
frantically to avoid such rights. 45 The common law doctrine of subro-
gation is somewhat technical, and state statutes on the subject also tend
in that direction; therefore, taxpayers often have been successful in
avoiding subrogation rights.46
The determination of whether a right of subrogation exists may
require a close analysis of the facts and local law. It may be im-
plied from the instrument or the circumstances.47
First, the regulations group the losses of guarantors, endorsers, and in-
demnitors together;48 this is patently misleading. It is almost universally
recognized that indemnitors acquire no subrogation rights. No bad
debt exists because no principal obligor becomes indebted to the in-
demnitor by reason of his payment. It is an original undertaking with
primary liability. The courts have recognized this proposition and have
allowed ordinary loss deductions where such a situation exists. 49
Next, cases dating back to Fox" have held that no subrogation rights
and, thus, no debt exists where the debtor is not in existence when the
guarantor honors his obligation.5' Of course, the Supreme Court (in
45. The taxpayer must bear in mind that a section 165(c) (2) loss does require a
"profit" motive. See, e.g., Pollak v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57, 58-59 (3d Cir. 1954);
Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443, 452-53 (1963); Charles B. Wigton, 13 T.C. 323 (1949).
On the other hand, the seven year statute of limitations does not apply to section 165 (c)
(2) losses. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6511(d) (1). The subrogation claim might have
economic value greater than the tax benefit of an ordinary loss. See Propp, supra
note 20, at 128, 131.
46. It is interesting to note the different approaches taken by taxpayers and often
accepted by the courts where the guarantor is trying to set up a reserve for bad debts.
See, e.g., Bolling v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1966). See also 3 J. RABKIN &
M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 35.06, at 3552-53 b. (1968
rev., Supp. 1968).
47. Id. at 3544.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-8 (1959). Section 166(f) of the 1954 Code also includes all of
these.
49. E.g., 3 J. RAHICN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 46, at 3549-50; Propp, supra note 20,
at 131. Where there is an indemnity, the taxpayer's biggest problem is showing that
the loss requirements (transaction entered into for profit) were met.
50. Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951).
51. E.g., J. C. Bradford, 22 T.C. 1057 (1954), ree'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 935
(6th Cir. 1956); Dan R. Hanna, Jr., P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 151,180 (1951); J. B. Book, Jr.,
[Vol. 10:705
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Putnam) expressly held that a debt did arise where the debtor was in-
solvent but still in existence, and suggested that the Fox doctrine was
not sound. 2
A third means of avoiding subrogation rights generally turns on the
provisions of the appropriate state statutes. Many such statutes provide
that there shall be no subrogation rights if any part of the guaranty
obligation remains unpaid. The reason for such a provision is sound:
the guarantor (as to the part unpaid) should not be put on equal terms
with the creditor in claims against the debtor. 3 Several cases have
turned on this narrow concept.54 In 1. C. Bradford,5e the taxpayer paid
$53,000 of his $56,500 guaranty obligation and was allowed an ordi-
nary loss deduction because he acquired no subrogation rights. There
may be other situations where subrogation claims can be avoided by
strict non-compliance with a state statute.
The most recent line of cases has involved payment by the guarantor
to obtain a release from his guaranty.56 For example, in Santa Anita
Consolidated, InC. 7 the taxpayer, with a $4,375,000 total potential
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49,020 (1949); Abraham Greenspon, 8 T.C. 431 (1947); Frank
B. Ingersoll, 7 T.C. 34 (1946). But see Thomas Watson, 8 T.C. 569 (1947). See generally
5 J. MERTENS, supra note 6, at 316-18, § 30.03, at 16-17; Propp, supra note 20, at 131; 57
COLUM. L. REv. 577 (1957).
52. See text, supra. The Court suggested that Fox was not sound because there was
no economic difference between a guaranty loss and a loss from a direct loan, not
because of any subrogation aspects.
53. See, e.g., 3 J. RABKIN & M. JoHNsoN, supra note 46, ar 3544 & n. 57. See also
American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 137 (1935).
54. Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443, 451-52 (1963). Cases turned on this factor
before Putnam was actually decided. J. C. Bradford, 22 T.C. 1057, 1069-70 (1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956); W. H. Hughes, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
52,240, at 708-09 (1952). Cf. J. J. Shea, 36 T.C. 577, 583 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 327
F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964). But see Lillian Kamler, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 66,046 (1966).
55. 22 T.C. 1057 (1954) (decided prior to Putnam), rev'd on other grounds, 233
F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956).
56. Commissioner v. Condit, 333 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964), aff'g 40 T.C. 24 (1963);
Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 50 T.C. No. 52 (July 2, 1968); Jack Schlosser, P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 65,186 (1965); J. J. Shea, 36 T.C. 577 (1961), affd per curiam, 327 F.2d
1002 (5th Cir. 1964). See Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443 (1963); John P. Dillon, 9
B.T.A. 177 (1927). The same result has been reached where expenses were incurred
to settle or adjust the guaranty obligation. Peter Stamos, 22 T.C. 885 (1954); E. P.
Addler, 44 B.T.A. 112 (1941); Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B.T.A. 214 (1939),
aff'd on other grounds, 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588 (1941). But
see Louis Schwartz, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 64,247, at 64-1629 (1964) (dictum suggesting
that the deduction could be disallowed altogether if consideration given for re-
lease cannot be valued).
57. 50 T.C. No. 52 (July 2, 1968).
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guaranty obligation, transferred his stock (half interest) and $4,396,000
to a third party in return for the release of his guaranty obligation.
($4,375,000 was his total potential guaranty obligation.) The pur-
chaser (who likewise obtained the other half interest) paid $5,000,000
on the loans and obtained the release of the guarantors-sellers. The
Tax Court allowed the taxpayer an ordinary deduction.aB In Jack
Scblosser,59 the taxpayer got an ordinary loss deduction where part
of his payment was for the release of his guaranty obligation and part
for indemnity against loss on another guaranty obligation.
One case has allowed an ordinary loss deduction upon payment of
the guaranty obligation after the guarantor had released the debtor (in
a bankruptcy proceeding).6° This case could have far reaching impli-
cations if followed by the courts in different fact situations.
How SHOULD SUCH LossEs BE TREATED?
The Subrogation Theory
In attempting to determine the proper treatment for guaranty losses,
the premise that the technical doctrine of subrogation is the answer must
be rejected. Certainly, subrogation rights should be recognized and to
the extent they provide recovery, there can be no deduction. But no
sound reasons exist to treat the loss on a guaranteed loan differently
because the guarantor acquired no subrogation claim, he acquired a
partially worthless claim, or he acquired a totally worthless claim.6 1 At
the least, the part that eventually proves to be worthless (whether it
be all or only a part of the subrogation claim) should be treated the
same in all cases.
The subrogation doctrine affects guarantors in a somewhat indis-
criminate manner; it by no means gives the same tax treatment to all
guarantors. Its application depends on such things as state subrogation
laws and whether a corporation is dead or dying. It depends upon
58. Note that the transaction could possibly be treated as part of a sale or purchase
of capital stock. See text accompanying note 78, & note 78, infra.
59. P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,186 (1965).
60. Frank B. Ingersoll, 7 T.C. 34 (1946). But see Robert M. Dinkel, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
60,079, at 60-473-74 (1960); Thomas Watson, 8 T.C. 569 (1947).
61. The courts presently distinguish guaranties which were intended as gifts and
allow no deduction for the same. There must be a reasonable expectation of recovery.
See 3 J. RABKIN & M. JoHrisoN, supra note 46, at 3546-47. As noted in the text, supra,
the courts also distinguish business bad debts. Here we are concerned with uniform
treatment of nonbusiness guaranty losses.
[Vol. 10:705
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whether the debtor corporation is dissolved prior to guaranty payment
-a fact which many stockholders can arrange. 2 It distinguishes be-
tween no rights and empty rights. 3 In many states it is significant
whether a guarantor pays all or essentially all of his obligation.6" One
who pays to be relieved of his obligation is favored over one who
honors his guaranty obligation. In short, it gives an unreasonable, un-
realistic solution to the problem.
Granted, the subrogation doctrine is about the only means of getting
guaranty losses under section 166(d) (1)65 because, where there are no
subrogation rights, there are no debts in a legal sense. However, this
is avoiding the question: Should such losses be given ordinary loss or
capital loss treatment?
Congressional Intent
Material concerning the Congressional intent in this area is scarce.
The statutes, of course, do not specifically mention guaranty losses
except in section 166(f) 66 (concerning guaranties of noncorporate ob-
ligations). While some have tried to use this section as support for a
result, they have not been very convincing.67 The Committee Reports
concerning section 166(d) (1) (nonbusiness bad debts) 6 and section
166(f) 69 have shed little light on the matter. The House Committee
Report gave an example of an abuse (loans to friends and relatives
with no expectation of recovery) which led to the adoption of the
nonbusiness bad debt section. Such an example should not limit the ap-
plication of a section of the Code as some taxpayers have contended.7 1
62. See Eaton, Guaranty Payment Where Debtor No Longer Exists: Loss or Bad
Debt, 31 TAxzs 222 (1953); Note, supra note 15, at 868; 57 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 580
(1957).
63. See, e.g., Propp, supra note 20, at 127.
64. The superficiality of this approach is illustrated by J. C. Bradford, 22 T.C. 1057
(1954) (discussed in text accompanying note 55, supra).
65. Another method would be to look through to the substance of the transaction,
but, often, the absence of subrogation rights is a difference of substance, but not a
difference justifying different tax treatment for guaranty losses.
66. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166(f).
67. See notes 42-44, supra, and accompanying text.
68. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 166(d). H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong, 2d Sess. 44,
45, 76 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942).
69. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 24, 199 (1954).
70. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1942).
71. See note 6, supra. But see 57 CoLum. L. REv., supra note 62.
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Even Congress' silence on the precise matter tells us little. From 1942
until 1956, a guarantor was usually allowed an ordinary loss deduction.
In 1956, Putnam signaled a reversal of that trend. In recent years, the
taxpayers again have been receiving favorable treatment with a high
degree of regularity. Certainly, Congress has not "consented" to a
uniform treatment of all guarantors. If Congress is condoning the
subrogation theory, it is avoiding the issue because, again, that theory
serves only as a stop-gap measure.
A Capital Loss?
The best argument for capital loss treatment is that there is no appre-
ciable economic difference between a guaranty loss and a loss resulting
from a direct loan or investment in stock. While each form of in-
vestment differs as to incidents, each is simply a means by which a stock-
holder seeks to increase the value of his present stockholdings by in-
jecting funds into his business. Each investment looks to ultimate capital
gain in this manner, so each should be given capital loss treatment.
7 2
Further, it is argued that payments to be relieved from or in partial
fulfillment of guaranty obligations are a direct result of the guaranty;
therefore, they should be treated like other guaranty losses (where
subrogation rights arise) under Putnam.73
There are several methods of achieving this result by judicial inter-
pretation. If subrogation rights exist, then that doctrine, of course, can
be applied. 4 If the guaranty is in substance a loan, then it should be
treated as such. The courts have suggested this latter result, but have
not applied it to guaranty losses. 75 Of course, the direct loan (as is the
case with the "subrogation" debt) will be deductible as a capital loss
when it is shown to be worthless.76
72. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U. S. 82, 92-93 (1956); Note, supra note 15.
For an example of the argument employed, see, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, Com-
missioner v. Condit, 333 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964). See text, infra, for important differ-
ences as to incidents of the various investments.
73. See, e.g., Eugene H. Rietzke, 40 T.C. 443 (1963); Brief for Petitioner at 9-10,
Commissioner v. Condit, 333 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964).
74. 68 HARv. L. REv. 1079, 1080 (1955) suggests that this doctrine could apply even
in a case where the corporation had been dissolved prior to the guarantor's payment.
This contention has no support, and little foundation.
75. E.g., Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 1955) (dissenting
opinion); Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 50 T.C. No. 52 (July 2, 1968). See Putnam v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82,92 (1956).
76. See generally 5 J. MERTENs, supra note 6, at 320-21, § 30.52, at 108-09; 3 J. R.maNs
& M. JoHNsoN, supra note 46, at 3551-52; Propp, supra note 20, at 117-19.
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If, when the guaranty is made, there appears to be no reasonable
chance of recovering this "loan," or if the guarantor pays the creditor
for release from the guaranty obligation (and, at the same time, releases
the debtor), the transaction may be treated as a contribution to capital.
The payment would then be added to the basis of the stock. Not only
would any loss be a capital loss, but it would be deferred until the
stock was sold or became worthless.77
Some courts have held that indemnity payments were in fact part of
the purchase price of stock, and should have been added to the basis
of the investment.7 Thus, the taxpayer was limited to a capital loss.
(This same rule might apply to guaranty losses.) 79
Some have suggested that the guarantor's loss deduction simply not
be allowed to rise higher than the creditor's-that the creditor's poten-
tial loss be transferred to the guarantor upon any payment (including
part payment) of his obligation. This doctrine was apparently applied
to limit the taxpayer to a capital loss in United States v. Keeler0 where
there was an indemnity to absorb the loss of other stockholders on their
investments.
An Ordinary Loss?
There do exist, however, sound arguments that all guaranty losses
77. See Bratton v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1954); Santa Anita Consol.,
Inc., 50 T.C. No. 52 at 50-376-79 (July 2, 1968); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950),
aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cr. 1951). For a thorough discussion, see Petitioner's Opening
Brief at 27-66 & Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15-31, Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 50 T.C.
No. 52 (July 2, 1968). The Government has unsuccessfully urged that stockholders'
guaranties of corporate indebtedness were capital contributions to the corporation in
cases dealing with matters other than guaranty losses. Murphy Logging Co. v. United
States, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967); Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475
(W.D. Ky. 1967); Fors Farms Inc. v. United States, 17 A.F.T.R.2d 222 (W.D. '"ash.
1965).
78. E.g., Alma R. Lockwood, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,278 (1962); Albert J. Harvey,
Jr., 35 T.C. 108 (1960); W.F. Bavinger, 22 B.T.A. 1239 (1931); John G. Paxton, 7
B.T.A. 92 (1927). This treatment is based on the economis reality doctrine of Arrow-
smith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
79. See, e.g., United Gas Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 312, 319-23 (3d
Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion); Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 50 T.C. No. 52, at 50-383
(July 2, 1968); Jack Schlosser, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 65,186, at 65-1066 (1965); J. J.
Shea, 36 T.C. 577, 581 (1961); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 31-34, Santa Anita Consol.,
Inc., 50 T.C. No. 52 (July 2, 1968).
80. 308 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932 (1962). But see Com-
missioner v. Condit, 333 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1964). This involves another economics
reality type approach.
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should be given ordinary loss treatment under section 165(c) (2)."1
In most cases, payment is based on the contractual obligation alone and
no debt (from debtor to guarantor) is contemplated at the time of the
guaranty agreement or when payment is made. The guaranty trans-
action is one unto itself.s
Each form of investment looks for capital gains resulting from the
increase in value of stock already owned because of the injection of
funds into the stockholder's business. In addition, a direct loan looks
to interest payments (but to a capital loss if there be any); and a stock
purchase looks to dividends and to further capital gain in case of sale
at a profit (but to a capital loss if there be any). A nonbusiness guaranty
looks for no additional income or gain; therefore, it should be allowed
the benefit of ordinary loss treatment (if there be any loss).
In addition, section 166(f) 3 gives a guarantor of a noncorporate
obligation (if the proceeds are used in the borrower's trade or business)
an ordinary loss deduction. Why should guarantors of corporate obli-
gations be discriminated against? This question is magnified when it
is recognized that there is less room to question the trade or business
use in such a case."4
Sections 1242 and 12445 give favorable treatment to losses on small
business investment company stock and small business stock, respec-
tively. It is ironical that (in these limited areas, at least) direct loans and
guaranty losses might be treated as capital losses; whereas, losses on
capital stock will usually be ordinary losses.
At the present time, such a judicial result (ordinary loss treatment)
usually occurs whenever the taxpayer himself avoids acquiring a subro-
gation claim. 6 However, Putnam would have to be overruled by the
Supreme Court before this result could be obtained in any other man-
ner in the courts.
81. INrr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(c) (2).
82. See, e.g., Plowman, supra note 28, at 151.
83. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166(f).
84. See 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 6, at 321 &. n. 57; 3 J. RAKiIN & M. JOHNSON, supra
note 46, at 3543; 57 CoTuM. L. REv. 577, 579-80 (1957). But see Plowman, supra note 28,
at 150.
85. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1242, 1244. See Dillingham, Ordinary vs. Capital
Losses on Business Investments, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 53, 79 (1964).
86. Assuming for the sake of argument that all taxpayers have the power to avoid
any subrogation claim, this would still not be an equitable solution. As discussed in
note 45, supra, there may be other considerations which require that the taxpayer
accept the subrogation rights. If he does, any loss is a capital one under present law.
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CONCLUSION
Generally, the tax treatment of losses resulting from individual non-
business guaranties of corporate obligations is decided on the basis of
subrogation theory. If the guarantor acquires a subrogation right, then
he gets a nonbusiness bad debt deduction (limited to capital loss treat-
ment) when such claim becomes worthless. If he gets no subrogation
claim, then he has an ordinary loss deduction if his guaranty was part
of a transaction entered into for profit. Often there is a close question
of fact as to whether the guarantor does acquire a subrogation claim.
More often, he clearly acquires a claim which is worthless at its incep-
tion. Herein lies the real difficulty with the subrogation doctrine as
applied in this area-that one who acquires a worthless claim should be
limited to a capital loss, whereas one who acquires no claim gets an
ordinary deduction. This problem is especially acute where the latter
has avoided obtaining a subrogation claim by not paying all of his
guaranty obligation or by paying to be relieved of his obligation. If
nothing else, all nonbusiness guaranty losses should be given similar
treatment without regard to such technical differences. Certainly, the
distinctions made are unrealistic.
The best solution to this problem would be for Congress to amend
the statutes in such a way as to make specific provision for these non-
business guaranties. Both sides appear to have good arguments; Con-
gress should decide whether the loss or the bad debt provisions should
apply. The following provision [adopted from section 166(f)8T]
would be appropriate if an ordinary loss deduction were preferred:
A payment by the taxpayer (other than a corporation) in dis-
charge of or for release of part or all of his obligation as a guaran-
tor, endorser, or indemnitor of a corporate obligation shall be
treated as a debt becoming worthless within such taxable year for
purposes of this section [except that subsection (d) shall not
apply].
Subsection (d), 1 of course, created capital loss treatment for non-
business bad debts. The latter part of section 166(f) which requires
that the principal obligation be worthless at the time the guaranty is
paid was dropped. Such a provision would exclude most transactions
87. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166 (f).
88. Id. at § 166(d).
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where there is a payment for release of the guaranty obligation or where
there is a partially worthless subrogation claim. These two situations
should be given the same treatment as other guaranty loss transactions.
If capital loss treatment were desired, the above language would
accomplish that objective if the last phrase (in brackets) were dropped.
Such transactions would simply "be treated" as bad debts, and the capital
loss provisions of the nonbusiness bad debt section would apply.
Until such time as Congress resolves this nagging problem, the courts
must do the best they can. While the reasoning in current cases appears
highly technical and stifled, the courts should continue to make such
distinctions under the present statutory scheme. Usually, the only way
to bring such a guaranty transaction under the nonbusiness bad debt
section is to find a debt resulting from a subrogation claim. At the same
time, courts have little choice but to apply that section when a subro-
gation claim has ever existed. No distinction should be made for such
claims which are worthless when acquired-they should be treated as bad
debts the same as claims which are worthless the day after they are
acquired. The courts should continue to allow an ordinary loss deduc-
tion (no matter how unjust) whenever no subrogation claim is acquired
-because the corporation has been dissolved or because the guarantor
simply paid to be released from his guaranty obligation. At least, if the
courts would consistently follow such a close technical doctrine, the
taxpayer would know what to expect and could plan his transaction
with some degree of certainty.
ROBERT S. PARKER, JR.
